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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Conclusiveness of Findings of Fact by Federal Commissions
-[Federal].-Certain practices of the respondent in furthering sales of its product in
interstate commerce were declared "unfair," "false, deceptive, and misleading" by the
Federal Trade Commission on the basis of a hearing before it, and a "cease and desist"
order was issued. The appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the order in part.' On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. The Commis-
sion's findings of fact were conclusive since supported by testimony. "The courts can-
not pick and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary to the findings of
the Commission." Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society.2
The Supreme Court has here, in the first opinion written by justice Black, struck a
decisive blow for administrative agencies by making its strongest unqualified state-
ment on finality of commission fact findings.3 Although statutes creating commissions
commonly contain express provisions on finality of findings,4 the majority of the Court
apparently apprehensives of decisions by administrative officials on increasingly nu-
merous commissions, has frequently exposed itself to the accusation of "picking and
choosing." By invoking the doctrines of "jurisdictional" and "constitutional" facts
' Fed. Trade Comm. v. Standard Education Soc., 86 F. (2d) 692 (C.C.A. 2d 1936).
258 S. Ct. 113, 116 (1937).
3 Examples of qualifying language: "Findings made by a legislative agency after hearing
will not be disturbed save as in particular instances theyare plainlyshown to be overborne ......
St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 54 (1936); "If there be substantial
evidence relating to such facts from which different conclusions reasonably may be drawn
...." Fed. Trade Comm. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 26o U.S. 568, 58o (1923); "We will reverse or
modify the findings only if clearly improper or not supported by substantial evidence."
Wash., V. & M. Coach Co. v. Labor Board, 3O U.S. 142, 147 (1937); "Administrative findings
on issues of fact are accepted by the court as conclusive if the evidence was legally sufficient
to sustain them and there was no irregularity in the proceedings." Phillips v. Conm'r of Int.
Rev., 283 U.S. 589, 6oo (1931). But the clarity of the instant opinion was approximated by
Justice Cardozo in Fed. Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 29i U.S. 67, 73 (1934): "What
the court did was to make its own appraisal of the testimony, picking and choosing for itself
among uncertain and conflicting inferences. Statute and decision forbid that exercise of pow-
er."
4 For examples, see Fed. Trade Comm. Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1927);
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i6o(c) (1937).
S "It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in
which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency-in this
instance a single deputy commissioner-for the final determination of the existence of the facts
upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend ..... That
would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish
a government of bureaucratic character alien to our system" (italics added). Crowell v
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, S6 (1932). See also St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
38, 51 (1936); Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1912).
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the Supreme Court has exercised broad powers of review,6 even to the extent of allow-
ing a trial de novo.7 And apart from those doctrines bits of evidence have been seized
to invalidate commission findings.8 Since the issue involved in the instant case could
hardly have been called "constitutional" or "jurisdictional," the decision seems wholly
consistent with those doctrines; but it is certainly an inroad upon review of ordinary
findings. It may even indicate a tendency to adopt the view, long advocated by a
minority of the Court, that the conclusiveness of findings should be extended even to
"jurisdictional" and "constitutional" issues.9 The recent changes in the personnel of
the Court seem to make this not wholly improbable. The compelling arguments of
procedural necessity, advanced by Justice Brandeis and others, show such an extension
to be highly desirable.1O
Conflict of Laws-Jurisdiction in Ten-Federal Court Required To Aid Collec-
tion of State Penal Forfeiture-[Federal].-Within four months after the State
of Texas had instituted suit in its own courts to confiscate oil allegedly produced
by the debtor in violation of the state oil conservation laws, the debtor, in good faith,
filed its petition in a federal district court in Texas for reorganization under section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act.' The state suit was restrained by the federal court under
section 77B (c) (Io),2 and the trustee of the debtor took possession of the oil from the
state court receiver. The lower court3 refused permission to the State of Texas to es-
tablish in a state court that its title to the oil arose at the time of unlawful production.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held (Justices Cardozo and Stone dissenting) re-
versed. Possession of the oil was not essential to the jurisdiction of the state court and
denial of the State's petition was an abuse of discretion. State of Texas v. Donoghue.4
By permitting the state court, in an action in rem, to adjudicate title to the oil while
not within its possession, the Supreme Court of the United States has acted dearly
6 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (x936) (rate making);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (i92o) (rate making); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (restraint of trade).
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (r920) (rate mak-
ing); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (X922) (deportation of allen).
8 See International Shoe Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 28o U.S. 291 (193o); Fed. Trade
Comm. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 26o U.S. 568 (1923).
9 See Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinions in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 65 (1932);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 292 (1920); Fed. Trade Comm.
v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429 (1920); his concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936); and Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in International
Shoe Co. Y. Fed. Trade Comm., 280 U.S. 291, 303 (1930).
lo Note 9 supra. See also Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative
Determinations of Questions of Constitutional Fact, 8o U. of Pa. L. Rev. 0o55 (1932).
'48 Stat. gix (i934), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (1937).
'48 Stat. 911, 917 (1934), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207(c) (1o) (1937).
3 See State of Texas v. Donoghue, 88 F. (2d) 48 (C.C.A. Sth 1937).
4302 U.S. 284 (I937).
